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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Samantha Nicole Cook entered a conditional guilty plea to two drug-related offenses,
reserving her right to appeal the district court’s order denying her motion to suppress. Ms. Cook
had moved to suppress evidence following a traffic stop for an unregistered vehicle. Her vehicle,
however, had a valid temporary permit, but condensation from rain on the vehicle had obscured
the permit from the police officer’s vision. The officer saw the permit once he got closer to
Ms. Cook’s vehicle. Despite seeing the permit, the officer continued with the traffic stop. On
appeal, Ms. Cook asserts that the district court erred by denying her motion because the officer
lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop upon seeing the properly displayed permit.
She further contends that the traffic law regulating temporary permits is void for vagueness as
applied to her conduct of driving in rainy weather.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Ms. Cook with two counts of felony possession of a controlled
substance, heroin and methamphetamine, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1), one count of
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, Suboxone, in violation of I.C. § 372732(c)(3), and one count of misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of
I.C. § 37-2734A(1). (R., pp.39–40 (Information), pp.50–51 (Amended Information).)
Ms. Cook moved to suppress the evidence due to an unconstitutional search and seizure.
(R., pp.53–54.) Specifically, she argued that the police officer did not have a lawful basis to seize
her because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. (R., pp.54, 77–80.)
She also challenged the specific traffic law as unconstitutionally vague. (R., pp.80–81.) The State
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responded. (R., pp.65–74, 108–17.) The district court held a hearing on her motion. (Tr. Vol. I,1
p.5, L.1–p.48, L.22.) The police officer, Deputy Jacobsen, testified. (Tr. Vol. I, p.6, L.16–p.24,
L.18.) In addition, the parties stipulated to the admission of the first four minutes and eight
seconds of Deputy Jacobsen’s dash cam video. (Tr. Vol. I, p.5, L.10–p.6, L.11; State’s Ex. 1.)
The evidence showed that, on October 29, 2016, around 12:18 a.m., Deputy Jacobsen,
with the Kootenai County Sheriff’s Office, was driving westbound on Highway 53. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.7, Ls.17–23.) It had been raining “kind of hard,” there was “a drizzle maybe” at the time, and
the roadway was wet. (Tr. Vol. I, p.16, Ls.11–24.) He observed a white Honda Accord traveling
eastbound on the highway. (Tr. Vol. I, p.8, Ls.2–5.) The car caught his attention because it did
not have a front license plate. (Tr. Vol. I, p.9, Ls.2–3.) As Deputy Jacobsen passed the car, he
looked in his rearview mirror, and he did not see a rear license plate on the car either. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.9, Ls.3–5.) He turned around to follow the car. (Tr. Vol. I, p.9, Ls.6–8.) He confirmed that he
did not see a rear license plate. (Tr. Vol. I, p.9, Ls.9–12.) He also did not see a temporary permit
on the front or back of the car. (Tr. Vol. I, p.9, Ls.13–15, p.9, L.22–p.10, L.1.) These permits are
typically displayed on the back window and sometimes in the rear license plate area. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.9, Ls.6–21.) Deputy Jacobsen also testified that he observed the car’s passenger side tires cross
over the white fog line once. (Tr. Vol. I, p.10, Ls.14–25.)
Deputy Jacobsen initiated a traffic stop. (Tr. Vol. I, p.12, Ls.18–24.) As the cars were
“slowing down and almost stopped,” Deputy Jacobsen saw a piece of paper in the back window
of the car. (Tr. Vol. I, p.13, Ls.5–6.) Deputy Jacobsen approached the car and briefly shined his
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There are four transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the motion to
suppress hearing and the district court’s oral ruling. The second, cited as Volume II, contains the
hearing on Ms. Cook’s motion for reconsideration. The third, cited as Volume III, contains the
entry of plea hearing. Finally, the fourth transcript, cited as Volume IV, contains the sentencing
hearing.
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flashlight on the paper, which was a temporary permit. (State’s Ex. 1, 00:55–1:10.) Deputy
Jacobsen could “could tell it was a registration,” but could not read the expiration date. (Tr. Vol.
I, p.13, L.17–p.14, L.4.) Deputy Jacobsen told the driver, Ms. Cook, that he stopped her because
she crossed the fog line “for a minute over there” and he “couldn’t see her temporary plate
because of all the fog over the top of it.” (State’s Ex. 1, 01:15–01:26.) He asked her some
questions, obtained her information, and then told her that he would “get you out of here in a
couple of minutes.” (State’s Ex. 1, 1:26–3:57.) Deputy Jacobsen returned to his patrol car.
(State’s Ex. 1, 3:58–4:07.) As he walked back to his car, he leaned over the trunk of Ms. Cook’s
car to take a closer look at her temporary permit with his flashlight and wiped off the
condensation. (State’s Ex. 1, 3:58–4:04.) Once he wiped the condensation off the window, he
could read the date. (Tr. Vol. I, p.14, Ls.5–7.) Deputy Jacobsen determined the registration was
valid through the end of November of 2016. (Tr. Vol. I, p.15, Ls.16–18.)
After this evidence and further argument by the parties, the district court took the matter
under advisement. (Tr. Vol. I, p.48, Ls.4–9.) A few weeks after the hearing, the district court
issued an oral ruling on Ms. Cook’s suppression motion. (Tr. Vol. I, p.50, L.1–p.60, L.15.)
First, the district court found that Ms. Cook’s car did not cross over the fog line. (Tr. Vol.
I, p.52, Ls.10–17.) As such, the district court held that Deputy Jacobsen’s fog line basis for the
traffic stop was unreasonable and in violation in the Fourth Amendment. (Tr. Vol. I, p.54, Ls.6–
13.)
Second, the district court turned to the temporary permit basis for the stop. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.54, L.14–p.60, L.5.) The district court found that Deputy Jacobsen did not see the temporary
permit until “he came up on the vehicle after putting on his emergency lights.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.54,
Ls.17–18.) The district court further found that the temporary permit itself, but not the writing on
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it, was visible from the dash cam video. (Tr. Vol. I, p.54, Ls.22–25.) The district court also noted
that Deputy Jacobsen stated that he had to wipe off a heavy condensation outside the window to
read the permit. (Tr. Vol. I, p.55, Ls.1–3.) The permit was valid. (Tr. Vol. I, p.55, Ls.4–5.) The
district court determined that Ms. Cook complied with the law, which required a temporary
permit to be in a “prominent place” and “readily legible”: “[T]he temporary registration was
placed on the left rear window where it could be readily legible. But for the condensation on the
outside of the window, it was readily legible. And the condensation presumptively being caused
by the atmospheric conditions of the drizzle on that night.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.56, Ls.16–22.)
Nonetheless, the district court “[r]eluctantly” ruled that the temporary permit, “though properly
posted,” was not actually “readily legible” as that phrase was interpreted by the Court of Appeals
in State v. Kinch, 159 Idaho 96 (Ct. App. 2015). (Tr. Vol. I, p.59, Ls.8–13.) The district court
emphasized its belief that Kinch’s interpretation of “readily legible” led to “unreasonable
situations”: “The Court finds it disturbing that a citizen, though in full compliance with the
requirement posting a temporary registration, is subject to being pulled over by law enforcement
due to an act of nature.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.59, Ls.14–24.) But, because the district court believed
Kinch controlled, the district court denied Ms. Cook’s motion to suppress. (Tr. Vol. I, p.59,
L.25–p.60, L.5; R., p.123.)
Ms. Cook moved for reconsideration of the district’s decision on the vagueness of the
temporary permit traffic law. (R., p.130–32.) The district court did not specifically address this
argument during its oral ruling. (Tr. Vol. I, p.50, L.1–p.60, L.15.) The district court held another
hearing and reasoned that Kinch addressed “the wording in the statute ‘readily legible,’ and
therefore the Court denies the motion for reconsideration.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.5, L.24–p.6, L.6.) The
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district court then entered an order denying Ms. Cook’s motion for reconsideration for the
reasons stated on the record. (R., p.136.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Cook entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of
felony possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, and misdemeanor possession of
paraphernalia. (R., pp.141–42, 145–46; Tr. Vol. III, p.9, Ls.18–24, p.12, Ls.4–24.) The other
charges were dismissed. (R., pp.148, 150.) Ms. Cook reserved her right to appeal the district
court’s denial of her motion to suppress. (R., pp.145–46, Tr. Vol. III, p.5, L.23–p.6, L.2, p.9,
Ls.1–4.)
The district court withheld judgment and placed Ms. Cook on probation for two years.
(R., pp.157–58.) She timely appealed. (R., pp.161–63.)

5

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Cook’s motion to suppress and motion to
reconsider?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Cook’s Motion To Suppress And Motion To
Reconsider
A.

Introduction
Ms. Cook contends the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress because

Deputy Jacobsen did not have reasonable suspicion to continue the traffic stop once he saw a
properly displayed temporary permit in her car’s rear window. Alternatively, Ms. Cook argues
the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress and motion to reconsider because the
traffic law at issue, I.C. § 49-432(4), is unconstitutionally vague as applied to her conduct. Under
either argument, the district court should have suppressed any evidence obtained from the
unlawful traffic stop.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014); State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584, 587 (Ct. App.
2013). The Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact “unless they are clearly erroneous.”
Wulff, 157 Idaho at 418. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if they are not supported by
substantial and competent evidence. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also Ellis,
155 Idaho at 587. “At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses,
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.”
Ellis, 155 Idaho at 587. The Court “exercises free review over the application and construction of
statutes.” State v. Kinch, 159 Idaho 96, 99 (Ct. App. 2015). Likewise, determinations of
reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo. State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 111 (2013).
Constitutional questions are also reviewed de novo. State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 377 (2013).
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C.

The District Court Should Have Granted Ms. Cook’s Motion To Suppress Because
Deputy Jacobsen Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion For The Traffic Stop Once He
Saw The Properly Displayed Temporary Permit
“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that ‘[t]he right of

the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.’” State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 607 (2016) (quoting
U.S. CONST. amend. IV)). “Traffic stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment.”
Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112 (quoting State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658 (2007)). “Limited
investigatory detentions are permissible when justified by an officer’s reasonable articulable
suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.” Id. “Under the Fourth
Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate if there is a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws.” State v. Edwards, 158 Idaho
323, 324 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); State v.
Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208 (Ct. App. 1998)).
“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational
inferences that can be drawn from those facts.” Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112 (quoting State v.
Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009)). “[A]n officer may take into account his experience and law
enforcement training in drawing inferences from facts gathered,” Danney, 153 Idaho at 410, but
“[t]he officer, of course, must be able to articulate something more than an ‘inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); see also
Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112 (same). “The test for reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of
the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop.” Morgan, 154 Idaho at
112.
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The duration of a traffic stop is narrowly limited to the stop’s purpose. “An investigative
detention ‘must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop.’” Danney, 153 Idaho at 409 (quoting Henage, 143 Idaho at 658). “The scope of the
detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion). “Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the
traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Linze, 161 Idaho at 608
(quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015)). “It is the State’s burden to
demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was
sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.”
Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 (plurality opinion).
The traffic law at issue here regulates the display of temporary permits (also referred to
as temporary registrations). “Idaho law requires that a motor vehicle be registered and display
license plates when being operated on the highways of this state, subject to certain exceptions.”
State v. Salois, 144 Idaho 344, 348 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing I.C. § 49-456(1)).2 One exception is
for a temporary permit. Idaho Code § 49-432(4) states:
A temporary permit shall be in a form, and issued under rules adopted by the
board, and shall be displayed at all times while the vehicle is being operated on
the highways by posting the permit upon the windshield of each vehicle or in
another prominent place, where it may be readily legible.
I.C. § 49-432(4). Here, the district court found Ms. Cook displayed the permit in a “prominent
place” in compliance with the statute. (Tr. Vol. I, p.55, L.24–p.56, L.19.) The district court also
found that the permit was “readily legible” but for the condensation on the exterior of the rear

2

Idaho Code § 49-456(1) states it “shall be unlawful for any person” to operate a motor vehicle
on the highway “which is not registered and which does not have attached and displayed the
license plates assigned to it for the current registration year, subject to the exemptions allowed in
sections 49-426, 49-431 and 49-432, Idaho Code.” This offense is an infraction. I.C. § 49-236(2).
9

window. (Tr. Vol. I, p.56, Ls.19–22.) Moreover, the district court found that condensation was
“presumptively” caused by “the atmospheric conditions of the drizzle on that night.” (Tr. Vol. I,
p.56, Ls.20–22.) Due to the rainwater temporarily obscuring the permit, the district court
reluctantly ruled that the permit was not truly “readily legible” as interpreted by State v. Kinch,
159 Idaho 96 (Ct. App. 2015). (Tr. Vol. I, p.59, Ls.8–13.)
Ms. Cook challenges the district court’s application of “readily legible” to her temporary
permit. She contends that the district court erred by relying on Kinch because Kinch’s
interpretation of I.C. § 49-432(4) is inconsistent with the statute’s plain language. Kinch should
be overruled or rejected3 by this Court or, alternatively, limited to its facts. Ms. Cook further
asserts that she complied with I.C. § 49-432(4) because her temporary permit was in a prominent
place and “readily legible.” Her properly displayed permit dispelled any reasonable suspicion,
similar to State v. Salois, 144 Idaho 344 (Ct. App. 2007), and therefore Deputy Jacobsen should
have ended the traffic stop without any further investigation.

1.

Kinch’s Interpretation Of “Readily Legible” Is Inconsistent With Statute’s Plain
Language And, As Such, Should Be Overruled Or Rejected By This Court

In Kinch, the Court of Appeals interpreted “readily legible” in a manner incompatible
with the statute’s plain language. Among other arguments, the defendant in Kinch argued that
“readily legible” meant the permit must “only be readily legible upon closer inspection, such as
when one is right next to the vehicle while it is stopped.” 159 Idaho at 100. The Court of Appeals
rejected this argument, stating:
I.C. § 49-432(4) provides that the temporary permit must be displayed in a
prominent place so as to be “readily legible.” This shows an intent by the
3

Ms. Cook recognizes that, if the Idaho Supreme Court retains this case, the Court does not
overrule Court of Appeals’ opinions, but can “agree with or reject that reasoning.” State v.
Clinton, 155 Idaho 271, 272 n.1 (2013).
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legislature that, unlike applications for specialty plates, temporary permits must
be visible (indeed, readily legible) while displayed on a vehicle. Moreover, as
noted by the state, the readily legible requirement for posting a temporary permit
applies “at all times while the vehicle is being operated on the highways.” Id.
Kinch’s argument that a temporary permit need only be readily legible upon
closer inspection, such as when one is right next to the vehicle while it is stopped,
ignores the plain language of the statute requiring that the permit be readily
legible while the vehicle is being driven. Thus, although the statute does not
explicitly provide that the temporary permit must be readily legible from the
vantage point of another vehicle on the road, the context of the statute and its
plain language make that implication clear.
Id. Based on this discussion, the Court of Appeals interpreted “readily legible” to mean that the
permit must “be visible while displayed on the vehicle” “from the vantage point of another
vehicle on the road.” Id. The Court of Appeals then equated “legible” with “readable.” The Court
of Appeals reasoned:
Kinch further contends that, if the legislature had intended for a temporary permit
to be readily legible from the vantage point of another vehicle, it would have used
the word “readable” instead; however, “legible” is a synonym for “readable.” 4
Moreover, the use of the adverb “readily” shows that the legislature intended for
the information on temporary registration permits to not merely be visible, but
easily readable—an addition only necessary if viewing the temporary registration
permit from some distance away. See WEBSTER’S NEW INT’L DICT. 1889 (3d ed.
1993) (defining “readily” as “with a fair degree of ease,” “without much
difficulty,” and “easily”).
Id. at 100–01 (citations and footnote omitted). Readable and legible are therefore

4

In support of this proposition, the Kinch Court provided the following citation:
WEBSTER’S NEW INT’L DICT. 1889 (3d ed. 1993) (defining readable as “that can
be read with ease,” with “legible” as a subdefinition); id. at 1291 (defining legible
as “capable of being read or deciphered” and “distinct to the eye”); see also
Legible, Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/ browse/legible (last
visited July 24, 2015) (defining legible as “capable of being read or deciphered,
especially with ease, as writing or printing; easily readable”); Readable,
Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/readable (last visited July
24, 2015) (defining readable as “capable of being read; legible”).

159 Idaho at 100–01.
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indistinguishable, according to the Court of Appeals’ interpretation. In sum, the Kinch
interpretation of “readily legible” requires the permit to be both visible and easily readable at all
times and from some distance away, which includes, but is not limited to, the vantage point of
another vehicle at an undefined distance.5
This definition of “readily legible” goes well beyond the statute’s plain language.
“Statutory interpretation begins with the statute’s plain language. That language is to be given its
plain, obvious and rational meaning. If that language is clear and unambiguous, the Court need
merely apply the statute without engaging in any statutory construction.” State v. Brand, 162
Idaho 189, 191 (2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, two words at issue are
“readily” and “legible.” “Readily” means “in a ready manner” and “with readiness,” such as
“with a fair degree of ease,” “without much difficulty,” or “easily.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INT’L DICT. 1889 (1971); see also Merriam-Webster, available at https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/readily (last visited December 18, 2017) (“in a ready manner: such as
without hesitating [or] without much difficulty”). “Legible” means “capable of being read or
deciphered,” as well as “capable of being discovered or understood by apparent marks or
indications.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICT. at 1291; see also THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICT. 411 (2016) (“capable of being read”). Combining the two definitions, the phrase “readily
legible” requires the permit to be capable of being read without much difficulty or hesitation.
The capacity to be read does not include visibility or even readability. Legibility turns on the
actual text on the permit—whether the numbers and letters are written or typed in a recognizable

5

The Court of Appeals explicitly declined to set a specific distance. Kinch, 159 Idaho at 101 n.7.
The Court of Appeals strongly suggested, however, that “the permit must be readily legible from
the officer’s vehicle, at least at some distance, otherwise a stop could never be initiated.” Id. at
101 n.8.
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manner. A permit can be “readily legible,” meaning that the pertinent information (such as the
expiration date) is typed in a large, familiar font, without the permit presently being visible or
readable. In short, readily legible refers to the appearance and display of the information on the
permit.
The Court of Appeals thus erred by equating legibility with readability and visibility.
Although the words could be synonyms in certain circumstances, they have very different
definitions. Those differences must be given significance when interpreting “the literal words of
the statute.” State v. Garner, 161 Idaho 708, 710 (2017) (quoting State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho
654, 659 (1999)). Legible denotes the capacity to be read, while readable means “that can be
read with ease, [such as] legible . . . [or] pleasing, interesting, or offering no great difficulty to
the reader” and “that can be read throughout.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICT. at 1889; see
also Merriam-Webster, available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/readable (last
visited December 18, 2017) (“able to be read easily: such as legible [or] interesting to read”).
Readable demands that the text is not only legible, but also immediately able to be interpreted
and understood. In contrast, legibility demands only the capacity or possibility of being read. It is
not a guarantee of readability at all times. Further, visibility and legibility represent different
requirements. “Visible means ‘capable of being seen,’ ‘perceptible by vision,’ ‘easily seen.’”
State v. Tregeagle, 161 Idaho 763, 767 (Ct. App. 2017) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L.
DICT. 2557 (3d ed. 1993)); see also THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICT. at 808 (“capable of being
seen”). Accordingly, visibility refers to the ability to see the permit in the windshield or other
window, while legibility refers to the information on the permit. These words—legible, readable,
and visible—have distinct meanings and cannot be interchanged in the statute’s plain language
interpretation.
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Moreover, the Kinch interpretation did not consider the permissive, as opposed to
mandatory, requirement of “readily legible.” The Court “has interpreted the meaning of the word
‘may’ appearing in legislation, as having the meaning or expressing the right to exercise
discretion.” State v. Guess, 154 Idaho 521, 524 n.2 (2013) (quoting Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841,
848 (1995)). “When used in a statute, the word ‘may’ is permissive rather than the imperative or
mandatory meaning of ‘must’ or ‘shall.’” Rife, 127 Idaho at 848. Here, I.C. § 49-432(4) does not
say that the permit “shall be readily legible” or “must be readily legible.” It says that the permit
“may be readily legible.” I.C. § 49-432(4) (emphasis added). While the statute mandates that the
driver display the permit at all times (“shall be displayed”), it does not mandate that the permit
be readily legible at all times. See I.C. § 49-432(4). This permissive language is consistent with
the plain language definition of readily legible—the statute only requires that the permit be
placed in a location where it may be capable of being read. Kinch, however, imposed mandatory
legibility. The Court of Appeals stated that the permit “must be readily legible from the vantage
point of another vehicle on the road” and “temporary permits must be visible (indeed, readily
legible) while displayed on a vehicle.” 159 Idaho at 100 (emphasis added). This too goes beyond
the statute’s plain language.
The Court of Appeals’ broad definition of “readily legible” in Kinch was contrary to the
statute’s plain language. The Court of Appeals read additional words in the statute to require the
permit to be visible and readable at all times, rather than requiring the permit to be written or
typed in a legible manner and displayed in a location where it could be capable of being read.
“Stare decisis requires that th[e] Court follows controlling precedent unless that precedent is
manifestly wrong, has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or overruling that precedent is
necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.” State v.

14

Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 4–5 (2015). Kinch’s statutory interpretation is manifestly wrong because it
expanded the temporary permit requirements beyond the statute’s plain language. See Owens,
158 Idaho at 4–6 (overruling a case because it “incorrectly looked at legislative intent” and
“overlooked the statute’s plain language”). This Court should overrule or reject Kinch’s
definition of “readily legible” and adhere to the plain language interpretation.
Applying the plain language, Ms. Cook complied with I.C. § 49-432(4). The district court
found that Ms. Cook placed her permit “where it could be readily legible.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.56,
Ls.16–19.) The district court also found that, “[b]ut for the condensation on the outside of the
window,” the permit “was readily legible.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.56, Ls.19–22.) The condensation,
however, affected the permit’s readability or visibility, not its legibility. There is no evidence
that the permit was filled out with indecipherable handwriting or an unusual font. Ms. Cook’s
permit itself was capable of being read without much difficulty or hesitation. The rainwater
temporarily hindered the permit’s readability or visibility, but it did not alter the actual text on
the permit. In accordance with the plain language, Ms. Cook’s permit was displayed in a location
where it could be “readily legible.” The district court erred by ruling that Ms. Cook did not
comply with I.C. § 49-432(4).

2.

If This Court Declines To Overrule Or Reject Kinch, Ms. Cook’s Temporary
Permit Was Still “Readily Legible” In Compliance With The Statute Because
Kinch Is Distinguishable From This Case

If this Court declines to overrule or reject Kinch, Ms. Cook asserts, in the alternative, that
the district court erred by determining that Kinch resolved this case. The facts of Kinch are
distinguishable, and Kinch does not determine the outcome here.
In Kinch, the defendant taped a temporary permit “in the top left corner of the vehicle’s
back window, but the officer could not read the permit because it was bent, somewhat crumpled,

15

and obscured by a layer of condensation on the window in the area where it was taped.” 159
Idaho at 97. Even after the officer approached the vehicle, “the officer still could not read the
permit due to the condensation and the bend in the paper.” Id. The Court of Appeals also upheld
the district court’s factual findings “that the temporary permit was ‘bent, crumpled, unreadable’
and obscured by a ‘fogged over’ window.” Id at 99. Further, the Court of Appeals noted, “[T]he
officer testified that, even while right next to Kinch’s vehicle, she was unable to read the
contents of the temporary permit.” Id. at 101 n.7. The traffic stop video showed the officer
“illuminate[ ] with her flashlight the opaque condensation blocking view of the permit.” Id. at 99.
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held:
[A]n improperly displayed temporary permit, including one that is not readily
legible, provides reasonable suspicion to perform a traffic stop. The inability to
easily read the key information of a temporary registration permit (such as its
expiration date), whether upon closer inspection or from the vantage point of a
nearby vehicle, raises a reasonable and articulable suspicion beyond mere
intuition or speculation that the temporary permit may be expired or invalid. Thus,
the officer here had reasonable suspicion to stop Kinch’s vehicle, and the district
court did not err in denying Kinch’s motion to suppress on that basis.
Id. at 102. Here, unlike Kinch, there was no evidence that Ms. Cook’s permit was bent or
crumpled. There was nothing about the condition of the permit itself that prevented Deputy
Jacobsen from reading it. Indeed, the traffic stop video shows a flat, un-crumpled permit in
Ms. Cook’s rear window. (See State’s Ex. 1.) Also, unlike Kinch, the district court found that
Deputy Jacobsen could have read the permit but for the condensation on the exterior of the car.
In Kinch, the Court of Appeals referenced a “fogged over” window and “opaque” condensation.
159 Idaho at 99. Although Kinch is unclear whether fog or condensation was on the inside or
outside of the car, the district court here clearly found that the condensation was on the outside of
the car and solely attributable to the rainy weather. (Tr. Vol. I, p.56, Ls.20–22.) The
condensation only temporarily obstructed the permit. Once Deputy Jacobsen wiped the
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condensation off Ms. Cook’s rear window, he could read the permit. Therefore, even if Kinch’s
interpretation of “readily legible” stands, the facts of this case and Kinch are distinguishable. The
district court erred by relying on Kinch to rule that Ms. Cook did not comply with I.C. § 49432(4).

3.

Once Deputy Jacobsen Saw Ms. Cook’s Properly Displayed Permit, He No
Longer Had Authority For The Seizure Because His Reasonable Suspicion Was
Dispelled

Under the plain language interpretation of I.C. § 49-432(4), Ms. Cook’s permit was
displayed in a prominent place where it could be “readily legible.” Kinch should be overruled or
rejected or, alternatively, distinguished from this case. Because Kinch does not control and
Ms. Cook complied with the statute, Deputy Jacobsen no longer had a lawful basis to continue
the traffic stop once he saw the properly displayed permit in Ms. Cook’s rear window.
This outcome is dictated by State v. Salois, 144 Idaho 344 (Ct. App. 2007). In Salois, the
Court of Appeals rejected the State’s position that “a law enforcement officer may stop any
vehicle being operated without license plates, even if the vehicle has a properly displayed
temporary registration, to investigate whether the vehicle is being driven in contravention of
traffic laws.” Id. at 348. The Salois Court reasoned, “The State’s position would allow law
enforcement officers to presume that temporary permits are invalid per se, justifying an officer to
stop a vehicle in order to conduct further inspection concerning the legitimacy of the temporary
permit. We reject that position.” Id. The Court of Appeals held:
[T]he presence of a properly displayed temporary permit, subject to the discussion
below, dispels any reasonable suspicion of a violation of I.C. § 49-456(1). To
hold otherwise would allow law enforcement officers of this state unfettered
discretion to stop each and every vehicle being operated with a temporary
registration to “investigate” its validity. To the contrary, an officer must have a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before a traffic stop is initiated, not after.
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A temporary permit displayed in compliance with I.C. § 49-432(3)6 carries with it
a presumption of validity, not of invalidity. The mere existence of the properly
placed temporary permit cannot serve as the basis for reasonable suspicion to
allow an officer to stop a vehicle to inspect the permit unless the invalidity of the
permit, such as by improper alteration, is obvious and discernable by the officer
prior to stopping the vehicle.
Id. Salois, therefore, holds that an officer may initiate a traffic stop due to the absence of a
license plate or permit, but the basis for that stop dissipates once it is established that the permit
is properly displayed. Id. Moreover, an officer may only initiate a traffic stop based on a properly
displayed permit if the permit’s invalidity is obvious and discernable to the officer before the
stop. Id. See also State v. Case, 159 Idaho 546, 549–52 (Ct. App. 2015) (reaffirming the
reasoning and holding from Salois for dealer plates).
Here, the presence of Ms. Cook’s properly displayed temporary permit dispelled Deputy
Jacobsen’s reasonable suspicion for an invalid or absent registration. A traffic stop may “last no
longer than necessary to effectuate” the stop’s purpose. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (quoting
Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 (plurality opinion)). Once Deputy Jacobsen shined his flashlight on Ms.
Cook’s rear window just prior to initiating contact with her, Deputy Jacobsen no longer had
authority for the seizure.7 See Salois, 144 Idaho at 348; see also Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614

6

Section (4) of I.C. § 49-432 was formerly codified at Section (3). See I.C. § 49-432(3) (West
2007).
7
Before the United States Supreme Court decided Rodriguez, the Court of Appeals held in
State v. Reed, 129 Idaho 503 (Ct. App. 1996), that the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness
standard allowed a police officer to prolong the detention of an individual during a traffic stop,
even though the officer’s reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop was dispelled. Id. at 505–
06. In Reed, the officer initiated a traffic stop for no license plates, but then saw a valid
temporary registration sticker as he approached the vehicle. Id. at 504. Although the officer “no
longer had reason to suspect that any unlawful act was being committed,” the officer proceeded
to talk to the driver and ask for his license and registration. Id. During their conversation, the
officer noticed the odor of alcohol. Id. Eventually, the officer arrested the driver for driving
under the influence of alcohol. Id. The Court of Appeals held that the officer was “entitled” to
obtain the driver’s identity and insurance information, “even though the reason for that stop had
dissipated.” Id. at 506. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the “slight prolongation of the traffic
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(“Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably
should have been—completed.”); Linze, 161 Idaho at 608 (same). Her permit was properly
displayed, and it contained no “obvious and discernable” “improper alterations” to render it
invalid, such as crumpled or bent paper like in Kinch. Deputy Jacobsen lacked reasonable
suspicion to detain Ms. Cook once he saw the permit and therefore the prolonged seizure was
unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614; Linze, 161 Idaho at
608.
The evidence obtained from Deputy Jacobsen’s search “would not have come to light but
for the government’s unconstitutional conduct” in prolonging the traffic stop without reasonable
suspicion. State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2005). Due to the unlawfully
prolonged stop, Ms. Cook submits that the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress.
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (evidence obtained through
unconstitutional police conduct subject to exclusion); Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810–11 (same).

D.

Alternatively, The District Court Should Have Granted Ms. Cook’s Motion To Suppress
Or Motion To Reconsider Because I.C. § 49-432(4) Is Unconstitutionally Vague As
Applied To Ms. Cook’s Conduct
“The void-for-vagueness doctrine is premised upon the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.” State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711 (2003),
abrogated on other grounds by Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313 (2013). “A void for vagueness
challenge is more favorably acknowledged and a more stringent vagueness test will be applied

stop was a minimal intrusion and was not so burdensome as to outweigh the public interests,”
relying on a balancing test from this Court in State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491 (1992). In light of
Rodriguez and this Court’s recent decision in Linze, the Court of Appeals’ decision in Reed no
longer has any precedential value on the legality of prolonged traffic stops. For this reason,
Ms. Cook submits that Reed should not apply to her case.
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where a statute imposes a criminal penalty . . . .” State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 198 (1998)
(citation omitted).
The void for vagueness doctrine is an aspect of due process requiring that the
meaning of a criminal statute be determinable. Due process requires that all “be
informed as to what the State commands or forbids” and that “men of common
intelligence” not be forced to guess at the meaning of the criminal law.
Id. at 197 (citation omitted) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)). “[A]s a matter
of due process, no one may be required at the peril of loss of liberty to speculate as to the
meaning of penal statutes.” Korsen, 138 Idaho at 711 (citing United States v. Smith, 795 F.2d
841, 847 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986)). “A statute is void for vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to
people of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes, see Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971), or if it invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement[,]
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).” Cobb, 132 Idaho at 197.
“A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to a
defendant’s conduct.” Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712. “The party attacking a statute on constitutional
grounds must overcome a strong presumption of validity. Appellate courts are obligated to seek
an interpretation of a statute that upholds its constitutionality.” State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 34
(Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted). “To succeed on an ‘as applied’ vagueness challenge, a
complainant must show that the statute, as applied to the defendant’s conduct, failed to provide
fair notice that the defendant’s conduct was proscribed or failed to provide sufficient guidelines
such that the police had unbridled discretion in determining whether to arrest him.” Korsen, 138
Idaho at 712.
Here, Ms. Cook asserts that I.C. § 49-432(4) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to her
conduct. It is an infraction for any person to operate a vehicle on the highway that is not
registered or in compliance with certain exemptions, including the temporary permits under
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I.C. § 49-432(4). I.C. § 49-456(1); I.C. § 49-236(2); see also I.C. § 18-811 (defining infraction).
Idaho Code § 49-432(4)’s requirement of a “readily legible” permit is unconstitutionally vague
as applied. First, the statute failed to provide Ms. Cook with fair notice that her conduct was
proscribed. Ms. Cook obtained a readily legible permit and placed it in a prominent location in
her car, in full compliance with the statute. The statute provides no notice that an external factor,
such as rain, would render the otherwise valid permit invalid. Owing solely to a temporary,
external condition out of Ms. Cook’s control, she was suddenly in violation of the law. 8 She had
no way to prevent this violation (since she could not stop it from raining or remove the water
from the roadway) or even to know the violation was occurring (since she would see the properly
displayed permit in her rearview mirror and had no way to see her permit from another vantage
point while driving). As applied to Ms. Cook’s conduct of driving in rainy weather, I.C. § 49432(4) is unconstitutionally vague because it does not give fair notice that an uncontrollable
weather condition will render a valid permit invalid and cause the driver to violate a traffic law.
Second, I.C. § 49-432(4) failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that the police have
unbridled discretion in determining whether to cite Ms. Cook for the traffic violation. As applied
here, the police can detain a person and cite him or her for a violation of this traffic law based on
the weather or any other external factor. “Anyone driving under less than optimal viewing
conditions” with “an otherwise unremarkable” permit would risk violating the traffic laws.
United States v. Edgerton, 438 F.3d 1043, 1050 (10th Cir. 2006); see also id. at 1051 (“We
decline to require optimal viewing conditions before compliance with a statute requiring an
otherwise unremarkable license plate to be ‘clearly visible’ is assured. Fourth Amendment

8

This argument does not concede that Ms. Cook’s permit was not “readily legible” under
I.C. § 49-432(4), as argued in Part C.
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reasonableness does not depend on external conditions, but on a reasonable suspicion that a
driver has violated the law.”). Rain, fog, glare, or even the officer’s poor eyesight would
transform a valid permit into an invalid one. See id. at 1050. One can imagine that a police
officer, wanting to detain certain drivers, could simply wait for the right weather conditions and
then initiate the traffic stop, especially in small towns where the police are familiar with the
residents and their vehicles. A violation of this traffic law is vested solely in the officer’s
discretion and whether he or she, subjectively at the time, could see the permit in the rain. As
applied, I.C. § 49-432(4) invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
In summary, I.C. § 49-432(4) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Ms. Cook under
either test—it failed to provide her with fair notice that driving in rainy weather on a wet
roadway would be proscribed conduct, and it failed to provide any guidelines to restrain the
police’s discretion in determining whether a permit was “readily legible.” Because I.C. § 49432(4) is unconstitutionally vague as applied, the district court erred when it denied Ms. Cook’s
motion to suppress and motion to reconsider on void for vagueness grounds.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Cook respectfully requests that this Court reverse or vacate the district court’s order
denying her motion to suppress or its order denying her motion to reconsider, vacate the order
withholding judgment, and remand her case for further proceedings.
DATED this 19th day of December, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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